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MARCH-APRIL, 1958
PRIOR STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS AS AFFECTING
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
By CHARLES P. GALLAGHER
Charles P. Gallagher received his B.S. de-
gree in Foreign Service from Georgetown
University in 1949, and his LL.B. from
Georgetown University Law Center in
1952. He is a member of the bar in Colo-
rado, Connecticut and the District of Co-
lumbia, and has been active in the Taxa-
tion as well as the Probate and Trust
Section of the Colorado Bar Association.
He is an attorney in the trust department
of the Central Bank & Trust Company of
Denver.
While state law determines the property rights and interests of
parties' the manner in which such rights and interests shall be subjected
to federal tax is determined by federal law.' To these principles should
be added an important corollary-that the determination of such rights
and interests under state law may be rejected by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the federal courts.' How these principles are
applied will be shown in this article.
W, a bereaved widow, is more bereaved when she is informed that
H, her deceased husband has left his entire estate to his children by a
former marriage. Her sorrow is unbounded when she is further informed
that the document she signed before her marriage to H is reputed to be
an antenuptial agreement, and that by it, she may have no rights to H's
estate.' W later is advised by her attorney that she has possible grounds
for having the antenuptial agreement declared invalid.
The executor of H's estate is advised of the widow's apparent dis-
pleasure with the will when W files her election to take the allowable
statutory interest.5 The executor informs the children that settlement
is advisable. An agreement is subsequently reached whereby, in con-
sideration of W's not attempting to exercise her statutory right to elect,
she is to receive one-fourth of H's estate outright. The executor in his
petition to the probate court sets forth the proposed agreement and the
fact that the antenuptial agreement may be of questionable validity.
The petition also says that H's children desire settlement in accordance
with the proposed agreement. No argument or evidence is otherwise
presented, and the probate court approves the agreement and issues its
1Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 12 (1937).
' Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
3 Estate of Arthur Sweet, 24 T.C. 488 (1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
4 Griffee v. Griffee, 108 Colo. 366, 117 P.2d 283 (1941).
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-5-5 (1953).
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order permitting settlement. Will the interest which W receives under
the settlement agreement qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduc-
tion?6
The legislative intent in such a situation as just presented was to
disallow as a marital deduction any settlement received by the surviving
spouse which did not reflect the surviving spouse's rights under state
law.' Subsequent regulations relating to this point indicated that the
Internal Revenue Service looked askance at such settlements. In effect,
the Internal Revenue Service said that a settlement of this type would
qualify for the marital deduction only if such settlement was a bona fide
recognition of the surviving spouse's enforceable rights. A presumption
of such recognition attached where the settlement was made pursuant
to a state court decision decided upon the merits in an actual adversary
proceeding. Settlements made pursuant to decrees obtained by consent, or
made pursuant to agreements not to contest the will, or not to probate the
will would not "necessarily" be accepted as a bona fide recognition of the
surviving spouse's enforceable rights.' The proposed regulations have
not departed from this view.'
Hence, it might appear in the example given that the executor of
H's estate will experience difficulty in obtaining the marital deduction
for the amount given to W. Such would not be the case, however, if the
executor can meet the standard set forth in the Tax Court case, Estate of
Gertrude P. Barrett." As long as the executor of H's estate can demon-
strate that W's grounds for setting aside the antenuptial agreement pro-
vided him with a reasonable belief that there was a serious and substan-
tial threat to the plan of the decedent, H, part of the standard is met.
Then, if the settlement was the result of arms length negotiations, the
criterion set forth in the treasury regulations, as interpreted by the
Barrett case, is met, and the amount given to W will qualify for the
marital deduction.
The result is sound law. If, in the illustration, W's claim had been
adjudicated on its merits, and if she had succeeded, the property interest
she would have received through her election would have qualified for
the marital deduction." Thus, if the executor has reasonable basis for
believing that the widow W's claim is valid, the settlement given her for
abandoning her claim is clearly in bona fide recognition of her rights
under state law. To have held that there must be an actual contest on
the merits would be to make the executor of H's estate defend a posi-
tion he reasonably believes untenable. Such an unreasonable require-
ment could very well result in a greater loss to the beneficiaries under
H's will.
It should be mentioned that the settlement which the surviving
spouse receives must be an interest which meets the other requirements
of section 2056 of the 1954 code in order to qualify for the marital deduc-
tion. 1 2 In our illustration, if the agreement had been that W would not
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
7 U.S. Code Cong. Serv., 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 12,6 (1948).
8 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47(g) (1949).
9 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1956). The language used in the
proposed regulation is the same as that used in U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47(g) (1949).
10 Estate of Gertrude P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 3.
11 Id. at 611: U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47(f) (1949); Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(e)-2(c) (1956).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) which states that a life estate or any other
similar interest which will terminate upon the occurrence of some event or lapse of
time will not qualify.
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receive the property outright, but would take it in trust and receive all
the income for life, with a remainder to H's children, the settlement
would not qualify.' Similarly, if widow W ostensibly receives the prop-
erty outright, but with the understanding that she immediately create
an irrevocable trust reserving to herself the income for life, with a
remainder to H's children, that settlement would not qualify. 4
Estate of Arthur Sweet1" is an example of the kind of a state court
proceeding which is not binding on the Commissioner and the federal
courts. In that case, the decedent had created a revocable trust. In 1948,
he amended the trust in an attempt to qualify it for the marital deduc-
tion. After his death and upon revaluation of the trust assets, it appeared
that the decedent's wife would not receive the full marital deduction
unless some portion of the revocable trust qualified. The Commissioner
refused to allow any portion of the trust to qualify because the general
power to appoint, given to the wife by the 1948 trust amendment, did
not extend to the whole trust. The Commissioner rejected the trustee's
contention that there were two trusts.'
The trustee brought suit in the Utah state court against the dece-
dent's wife and remaindermen, seeking construction of the trust instru-
mnents and instructions as to its duties thereunder. In its complaint the
trustee suggested that two trusts had been created by the 1948 amend-
ment to the trust. At the hearing the trustee presented arguments and
other evidence, but the defendants, having failed to answer or otherwise
plead, did not appear. Default judgments were rendered against the
defendants that same day, and the court immediately rendered its
opinion (which followed much of the language in the trustee's com-
plaint) and ordered the trustee to separate the trust estate into two
trusts.
In its decision the Tax Court noted the following sequence of
events. The state court proceeding was instituted after the Commissioner
refused to recognize the two trusts. The trustee's complaint suggested
13 Ibid.; Estate of Hyman Kleinman, 25 T.C. 1245 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 245
F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957).
14 Cf. Estate of Thomas W. Tebb, 27 T.C. 671 (1957); Comment. 43 Va. L. Rev.
740 (1957).
15 See note 3 supra.
16 The case arose under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812 as amended by 62 Stat. 117
(1948) which permitted such a trust to qualify for the marital deduction only if the sur-
viving spouse could exercise the general power to appoint the whole trust. Under the
present law, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056, a general power to appoint just a specific
portion of a trust would qualify.
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that two trusts were created. Default judgments were rendered against
the defendants after they failed to answer, plead, or appear. The state
court's opinion was rendered the same day as the hearing in almost the
same language as the trustee's complaint. Finally, the trustee had not
complied with the state court's order regarding the separation of the
trust estate into two trusts. The state court's decree was rejected by the
Tax Court as not being determinative of interests in property under
state law.17 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in affirming
the Tax Court decision, concluded that the state court proceeding had
been brought with the concurrence of the trustee and the trust bene-
ficiaries solely to circumvent the Commissioner's contention. "The
(state) court decree," the court of appeals said, "was obtained by col-
lusion for the purpose of maintaining the claim for marital deduction.
And it therefore is not binding in this proceeding.""5 Once collusion or
fraud is found in cases involving state determination of property rights,
the Commissioner and the federal courts will find that they are not bound
by the state court proceeding.
Whether or when a state court proceeding is binding on the Com-
missioner and the federal courts seems to be a continuing problem. It has
arisen in other types of cases affecting the marital deduction. Thus,
should the widow's portion under the will bear the proportionate share
of taxes attributable to that share under state law?1" Can the widow
elect to take her statutory interest in lieu of the interest given to her
under a joint and mutual will?2' Do certain insurance policies qualify
for the marital deduction?
21
Moreover, that there is variance of opinion as to the effect of some
of these state court proceedings may be gathered by the following lan-
guage in the case of Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States:
22
"it is apparent that both sides agree, that if the probate court
final decree was entered by consent of the parties or in a non-
adversary proceeding, it is not binding upon defendants in this
Federal estate tax litigation. It is, therefore, unnecessary for
us to pass upon the validity of that proposition of law and
we are relieved of any obligation to consider and reconcile a
number of seemingly conflicting Federal courts of appeals
cases."'
Although this article does not attempt to reconcile the seeming
conflict in the circuit courts, certain conclusions may be gleaned from
17 Estate of Arthur Sweet, 24 T.C. 488, 495 (1955).
18 Estate of Arthur Sweet, 234 F.2d 401, 404 (10th Cir. 1956) (parenthetical matter
added).
19 Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (6th Cir),
cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 148 (1957), in which the circuit court found the Indiana
state court's decision permitting the widow to take her portion under the will free
from taxes was not binding. But see Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
2 Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. No. 48 (May 24, 1957). The court held that
the Iowa state court's order approving the widow's election against the joint and
mutual will was not binding. Compare with Awtry v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749
(8th Cir. 1955), reversing 22 T.C. 167 (1954).
21 Estate of William Walker Wynekoop, 24 T.C. 167 (1955), which held that the
Illinois state court's decision regarding insurance policies was a binding one, and the
policies qualified for the marital deduction.
22 Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (6th Cir.
1957).
23 Id. at 417
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the cases involving the determination of property rights in a prior state
court proceeding. These conclusions may be of some help in analyzing
similar situations affecting areas of federal taxation, including the mari-
tal deduction.
It would seem that where there has been a determination of prop-
erty rights under state law, which is binding on the parties, the state
court proceeding should be binding on the Commissioner and the federal
courts as long as the state court determination was not tainted with fraud
or collusion. Even though the proceeding may be nonadversary, the
parties friendly, and a tax saving effected, these factors alone should not
be enough to permit the Commissioner and the federal courts to reject
the state court's determination and substitute his or their own finding.
2
1
If state law, as interpreted by the state court proceedings, is to determine
property rights and interests of the parties, those proceedings should be
binding on the Commissioner and federal courts.
A different conclusion is reached where the federal government has
established a criterion as to the taxability of a property right, or the
qualifying of such property right for a deduction under federal law.
In this case, the state court proceedings should be binding on the Com-
missioner and the federal courts only if the criterion as established by
the federal government is met. Hence, whether a property right received
in settlement of a will controversy will qualify for the marital deduction
will be determined by the criteria set forth in Treasury Regulation 105,
§ 81.47 (f), and Proposed Treasury Regulation § 20.2056 (e) -2 (c).
Whether or not the criteria are met, of course, will be determined
by the Commissioner. It is in cases involving some federally established
criterion that variable factors become very important. These factors may
be the relationship of the parties, the reasonableness of the issues or
claims, how the issues or claims are adjudicated or settled, and the tax
consequences. The attorney may feel that he can take little solace in
cases involving this problem since the Commissioner will determine
whether the criterion has been met in the state court proceeding. How-
ever, as long as the claims or issues involved are bona fide and reason-
able, and as long as the settlement or adjudication in the state court
proceeding is bona fide and reasonable, the Commissioner should be
bound. This proposition was affirmed in the case of Estate of Gertrude P.
Barrett and to this extent, should give attorneys some consolation.
'4 Gallagher v. Smith. 223 F.
2
d 218, 226 (3rd Cir. 1955).
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